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Abstract
My paper contributes to the existing literature regarding discriminatory practices in the
mortgage market. It is argued that the development of the mortgage market, and specifically the
rapid expansion of the secondary market, gave rise to new discriminatory practices (predatory
lending, algorithmic based discrimination). My project analyzesthe specifics of these developments
and how they are associated with the introduction of these current discriminatory acts, outlines the
changing incentives behind them and argues that current legislation has been proved to be too
inflexible to adapt to the changing nature of the mortgage market and of the practices themselves.
Furthermore my suggestions provide insights on how existing legislation can become more flexible
in order to be able to identifr such newly introduced discriminatory practices and recommend ways
to monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making process of today.
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Introduction
The mortgage market and the discriminatory practices involved in it have evolved drastically
over the past couple of decades. The creation of the GSE's and the secondary market (Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac), the introduction of the process of securitization,and the increased financial complexity
of mortgage products that came with the latter development blurred incentives behind potential
discrimination and altered the forms and character of discriminatory practices. The securitization of
housing mortgages has created a segmented lending process where the responsibilities of funding,
originating, serving, and holding mortgag. loun, fall under unrelated business entities (Hauser,
2008). A number of new agents are now evolved in the decision-making process; mortgage
originators, underwriters, mortgage brokers, assignees, ¿uïangers. Each one of them possesses the
means and incentives to discriminate at any part along the decision-making process, whether that is
during the underwriting procedures or during the final oassignment' of the loan. The increasing
demand of mortgage products and the large number of new potential customers that resulted from the
rapid technological advancements that caused wider accessibility to financial products introduced
algorithmic decision-making process in the secondary market to efficiently cater to all the needs of
the potential borrowers and to supposedly better the conditions under which the loans are approved.
Discriminatory practices that \Mere once apparent, commonly used and widely accepted by
financial and banking institutioris such as redlining, slowly disappeared from the mortgage market,
mainly because of the Civil Rights movement and the changing mentality towards prejudiced
practices and bigotry, in general. All the afore-mentioned developments however gave rise to new
types of discriminatory practices, such as those regarding predatory lending and algorithmic-based
discrimination. My project analyzes the specifics of these developments and how they are connected
to the newly introduced discriminatory acts, outlines the changing incentives behind the recent
discriminatory practices and argues that current legislation has been proved to be too inflexible to
adaptto thg changing nature of the mortgage market and of the practices themselves.
My findings are parallel with current literature in that existing legal doctrine has been unable
to keep up with the changes within the mortgage market and the inherent discriminatory practices of
algorithmic discrimination and predatory lending. For the latter, the existing definitions of predatory-
lending practices leave room to lenders to craft mortgage products that fall outside the scope of
federal legislation. Current antiquated legislation such as the 'holder in due course' doctrine and the
'do equity' requirement, furthernore offer little to no options to victims of predatory-lending
practices. My analysis supports existing literature that aims in the abolishment of such antiquated
legal frameworks.
For algorithmic-based discrimination, my analysis supports the notion that the legal
framework surrounding it has proved to be ineffective since it provides little to no insight on how to
monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making process of today. Courts and legislative bodies
do not directly examine the exact variables involved in the algorithmic underwriting process, nor do
they scrutinize the mortgage originator's decisions regarding the weight that was placed upon these
variables. They rather focus on the mortgage originator's discretion policy, since it is quite difficult,
to revisit the exact algorithmic decision 
-making process and its parameters that occurred in the past.
My suggestion, from a legislative point of view, aims at refocusing attention from condemning the
discretion given to the mortgage originators as causing pricing disparities to condemning the
decision-making mortgage originators themselves. A measurement to achieve this, I suggest, would
be to,report and compare the underwriting details that are produced by the algorithmic 'Black Box'
to what is actually later underwritten and assigned by the mortgage broker as a result of his
discretion. In cases where there is a clear difference between these two sets of mortgage specific
characteristics, one could assume'that the differences are products of discriminatory incentives on the
part of the mortgage broker.
Chapter I
Discrimination in the mortgage market and how to address it has historically been a critical
issue of the U.S civil rights agenda. It has been suggested that in the past, institutions such as banks
and insurance companies actively discriminated against minorities, as practices such as redlining
were cofirmon for lenders and were even adopted by govemment organizations. 'Redlining' is a term
coined in the 1960's, whereby banks and other services, would literally draw a red lines around
certain neighborhoods on city maps that had 'undesirable' demographics, such as predominantly
African American neighborhoods. Since that time, housing and civil rights advocates have been
actively trying to eradicate discrimination in the mortgage lending market. This has prompted the
introduction of several bills that deemed any form of discrimination illegal, in the hope of totally
eradicating these discriminatory practices, including 'Executive Order 11063' in 1962, and the 'Fair
Housing Act' of 1968, which will be referred to later in the paper. Although the conditions for
acquiring mortgages have, improved for minorities, discrimination still exists ihe mortgage market
has grown into a complex financial system throughout the years, and the changing nature of
discriminatory practices, makes it much more diffïcult to observe than during times when practices
such as redlining, for example, \ilere used. Today, discrimination in the mortgage market is subtler.
My project v¡ill examine how the changing nature of the mortgage market has affected
discriminatory practicès and it is expected that à pattern of denial regarding mortgage lending to
people of color will be observed and that loans approved to minority borrowers will have higher
expected profitabilify than those to majorities with an almost identical credit background.
As the mortgage market was heavily legislated after the 2008, subprime mortgage crisis, the
issue is still extremely critical. The next section will focus on the historical and legal context of
discrimination in the housing market.
Historical and legal context of discrimination & redlining in the mortgage market
Race is a protected classification under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution passed in
1868. It declared that all states 'shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States...[or] deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, [or] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.' Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, among others to enforce this Amendment.
(Dymski, 2002) The Act declared that all people born in the United States are legitimate citizens and
as citizens, are guaranteed the right to 'make and enforce contracts', take legal action against those
who breach them, etc. Throughout the years however the Supreme Court gave each state the
responsibility of deciding the level of applicability of this Act. As a consequence, many states
completely undermined its workings. It was during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's that
social pressures lead to the demand for respect of all races. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy
signed the 'Executive Order 11063',the first piece of legislation to ban discrimination in the housing
market (Dymski, 2002).More specifically, it "prohibits discrimination in the sale, leasing, rental, or
other disposition of properties 
.and facilities owned or operated by the federal govemment or
provided with federal funds." Fundament aIIy, it was the first piece of legislation to ban racial
discrimination in federally funded housing. The Fair Housing Act of lgíS,provided equal housing
opportunities regardless of race, religion and national origin. This act 'makes it unlawful for any
person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions
to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction,.42 U.S.C. $ 3601).
HOLC & Redlining
During the Great Depression the rapid expansion of the residential housing market created a
housing 'bubble', which led to a series of major crises in the mortgage market during the 1930's. In
the wake of these crises, Congress, under the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt established a
series of federal policies, which aimed at reconstructing the nature of housing finance. These policies
altered the nature of mortgages by turning them from short term loans to loans withl5 to 20-year
durations.
Furthermore, Congress passed the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, which lead to the
creation of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), and the National Housing Act in 1934,
which partially lead to the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The Act of 1934,
made an effort to stimulate the construction industry by overhauling the process of buying a home;
before the Act, one could only receive a mortgage if one had a large amount of the mortgage
payment akeady at hand. Furthermore, mortgages did not have the long-term dwability they have
today. The Act of 1934 allowed for a small down payment and monthly payments spread over 20
rather than l0 or lSyears. This was important as it created new opportunities for people who could
not previously afford a house The purpose of the 'Home Owner's Loan Act' of 1933 was to
refinance home mortgages currently in default to prevent foreclosure (Carliner, 1998). Specifically,
its initial goal was to issue bonds in order to be able to refinance mortgages at more favorable terms.
This is important as it created new opportunities for people who could not previously afford to buy a
house. In an effort to do this "residential security maps" of 239 cities were created to estimate the
supposed level of security for real-estate investments in each city. These maps were based on both
the input of thousands of local brokers and surveys of neighborhood of housing markets together
with demographic characteristics. In.these maps the neighborhoods that were thbught to be more
secure in case of investment were marked with a green color and were known as a "Type A"
neighborhoods, whereas the most risþ areas were called "Type D" and were marked in red. Data
collected has shown that some areas were, in the long term, recorded as receiving fewer housing
loans compared to others. There is clear evidence that showcases that the racial composition of ¿rn
area played a huge role in the grade the area was assigned (Aaronson, Hartley, Mazumder 2019).
Evidence of that is apparent in the description file of the HOLC mapsr. The inner cities'redlined'
areas, were in almost all cases, charactetized by African 
- 
American communities and were left
underdeveloped or left to decay, as any type of commercial investment inthese communities \¡ras
deemed.to be too 'risþ'. The reasons why loans in minority communities are riskier will be
explained in a further chapter,
'Hillier (2005) quotes the 1937 FHLBB Appraisal Manual in desøibing neighborhood grades as
follow'.
. Grade A : 'homogeneous," in demand during "good times or bad.'o
. Grade B : o'like ù1935 auúomobile-still good, butnot what the people are
buying today who can afford a new one"
. Grade C: becoming obsoleûe, "expiring restrictions or lack of them" and
'iinfiltration of a lower grade population."
. Grade D: "those neighborhoods in which the things that are now taking
place in the C neighborhoods, have already happened."
t Area Descríptíon 
- 
Securíty Map of Tacoma: 'This might be classed qs a'Low Yellow' ereawere
it notþr the presence of the number of Negroes and low class Foreígn Famílies who reside in the
a.reQ..'
Example of the original 1938 HOLC "Residential Security" m,ap of Atlanta with color-coded
gradøtion ofneighborhoods by risk level,
The Federal Home AdministratiQn, which was responsible for almost half of all the houses
sold during the 50's and the 60's, used racial criteria regarding the decisions on whether not to
approve FDA loans for specific neighborhoods. This occurred as a result of both the Acts signed in
1933 and 1934. During the post-Great depression era, optimism and prosperity created a demand for
new housing and the Government signed the 1934, Housing Act to encourage investment. In an
attempt to 
,boost the construction industry, banks decided to invest in new construction projects
rather than re-investing in old neighborhoods. This, combined with the Federal Aid Highways Act of
1954, which provided Federal invesünents to expand the national highway system encouraged the
rise of the suburbs. Those who were not financially fortunate enough to be able to move to the
suburbs remained in the cities. As a result of pre-existent discrimination, in almost all cases the
communities that were unable to move in better neighborhoods were African 
- 
American. As a result
of pre- existing discrimination, in many cases the communities that were unable to move into better
neighborhoods were African 
- 
American. But as residents left the inner cities for the suburbs, so did
businesses and investments. Many already deprived neighborhoods sank further into poverty. \iVhen
old business collapsed, because of the lack of investment, new ones did not replace them, leaving
sometimes-entire commercial blocks empty. Redlining in other words was thê "discriminatory
pattern of disinvestment and obstructive lending practices that act as an impediment to home
ownership anxong African Americans" (Gaspaire, 2012).
There is however an active debate from a historic and economic point of view on the exact
impact the HOLC maps had on lenders. Hillier argues that the FHLBB (Federal Home Loan Bank
Board) under which HOLC operated, did not in fact spread the maps but preserved their
confrdentiality by only allowing a limited number of copies to be made (Hillier, 2003). On the other
hand Woods disputes these conclusions (Woods, 2012).It is argued in his paper that not only did the
FHLBB widely spread their appraisal practices, but also encouraged the development of a
communication channel between the private sector and government institutions that hugely
influenced the creation of a 'uniform appraisal process' Q4aronson, Hartley, Mazumder 2019). His
evidence also suggests that banks created their own maps to illustrate potential risþ investments
among neighborhoods as apartof their policy guidelines. He argues that 'there existed a relationship
between the HOLC security maps and FHLBB lending policies"(Woods,2012). Woods points out
that lending institutions in particular, had to incorporate a 'security map of the institution's lending
area' in their balance sheet and were specifically advised that 'the best method of grading residential
neighborhoods as lending areas is to make a scientific analyòis of the entire community and of each
neighborhood within it.'(Woods ,2Ll2)Additionally, he introduces evidence that reflect the fact that
the Mortgage Rehabilitation Division of the FHLBB made security maps of residential areas,
accoinpanied by simplified instructions, that could be used by *y experienced mortgage lender and
that the categories in such maps were almost identical to the HOLC maps.
There are even anecdotes that suggest that some lenders had access to the actual HOLC maps.
Jackson argues that "private banking institutions were privy to and influenced by the government
security maps" (Jackson, 19S0). There is even evidence of a Chicago real estate agent
communicating the following to the City Survey Program Director: "I hope to be able to 'borrow' a
map from your'portfolio when you are not looking during your journey in Chicago (Hillier, 2003).In
a wider setting Greer suggests that alarge number of real estate agents had a significant impact in the
creation of these maps. (Greer, 2012)
While it is almost impossible to fully comprehend the extent to which mortgage lenders used
these maps, It is evident that the FHLBB encouraged the practice of using similar maps to estimate
the credit worthiness of a neighborhood. It is also evident that at that point in time at least, redlining
\¡/as occruring on the basis of racial composition of the neighborhoods.
The unfairness of this issue was slowly fought against, firstly with the est¿blishment of the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act in 1975, which 'required lenders to report the number and dollar volume of
residential loans by Census tract' and the Community Reinvestment Act, which encourages
institutions to meet their credit needs evenly among all neighborhoods (specifically low income
neighborhoods)(Dymski,2002). Furthermore, since 1990, all depository institutions over a cert¿in
asset-size threshold are required to post all available information, including the applicant's race, for
every single loan application. The process of redlining itself has almost disappeared throughout the
years, but racial discrimination is still very present. In 1994 the federal agencies that were
monitoring discrimination' in the housing and ciedit market issued a þolicy statement that
fundamentally shaped the legal meaning of discrimination. Three classes of racial discrimination
were identified (Mars den, 1994).
1. Overt dÍscriminatíon 
- 
Flatly refusing to initiate a transaction with a person of color.
2. Disparate treatment 
- 
screening minorities more stringently than whites in application
processes or subjecting minorities to different application processes.
3. Disparate impact 
-conducting commercial practices that disproportionately harm a racial
minority without the justification of a legitimate business need.
The first two categories suggest that disuimination is a product of intentional prejudicial
behavior. In the first case those discriminating are purposely denying minorities certain transactions,
while the second case describes behavior that, although it might be unintentional, is, nevertheless
harmful in its impact.
In the third category, disparate impact, occurs when systematic procedures that appear to be
neutral, result in a disproportionate impact on the protected minority group. If a business model does
not justiff these practices then the racial divisions that the practices result in, are not perceived to be
socially legitimate..
Theoretical Models of Discrimination and Redlining in the Housins Market
The root of the controversy suïounding racial discrimination in the mortgage market lies in
the origins of the theoretical work on this topic. Empirical models on housing disøimination were
developed without reference to the Civil Rights era legislation (Dymski, 2002). The fundamental
models assume that racial discrimination will be benign as employers who practice racial exclusion
will sacrifice income to satis$ their prejudicial tastes. Thus according to these models any action
against the racially biased is unnecessary as they are punishing themselves. The only text that
analyzedrucial discrimination and was in sync with the risê of the civil rights movement was Gary
Becker's 'The Economics of Discrimination'. His "tastes and preferences" approach towards market
labor discrimination has been dominant over the past years and his findings act as a pillar of general
theory that can be applied to different forms of discrimination. He defines discrimination in
monetary terms, associating it with the disutility caused by the contact with some individuals and
believes that if someone "has a taste for discrimination, he must forfeit income to prevent that
contact' (Becker, 1g7l). Thus discrimination is costly for the employers who choose to sacrifice
profits to strengthen their preferences. In a competitive market it is assumed that the discriminator
will fail to surúivè, as the non-prejudiced competitor will incur lower costs than the discriminator
and in the long run he will either stop discriminating or close down. Thus, there is no need for
interference, as discrimination will disappear by itself. In the housing market Becker's theory
assumes that in a case where all white residents are bigots, whites will pay a premium to avoid areas
with a strong minority representation. In other words the discriminator is paying in order to practice
his racist tendencies. But if all real 
- 
estate agents are also bigots and in combination with other
mcial covenants force the minorities into restricted neighborhoods, the minorities are the ones who
truly pay the premium for lower-quality homes, as following the economic rule of supply and
demand, the large numbers of non-whites looking at a restricted number of homes increases the price
of the houses. (Dymski, 2002)
Masson's (1973) and Courant's (1978) models developed an empirical theory that applies the
Becker-type point of view to the housing market. They examined the case where searching for
housing is costly and where all white agents are discriminators. Their results proved that Becker's
theory of the discriminator paying is invalid, as racial discrimination makes searching for housing
more costly for minorities than for whites (Dymski, 2002) The minorities end up paying more while
being able to search less. Furtherrnore, Yinger's model wiûressed racially neutral landlords
discriminate against minority renters as a result of the bigoted white residents who lived in the
premises. (Yinger, Ig75)
Dymski's theory is particularly important as it develops the concept of discriminatory costs
that arc not necessarily created by people who have prejudicial tendencies. In his application of the
Becker model to the credit market he found out that while bankers may have no overtly racist
tendencies, they might indeed offer stricter credit terms on lending in white communities, where a
substantial number of white bigots exists (Dymski, 1995). He also found that in cases where
minorities prefer white neighborhoods, 'rational' bankers protect their profits, that is, the higher
premiums paid by white residents in order to keep their neighborhoods minority free. It is therefore
clear that there can be racial prejudice without racist intent, as the perpetrators are not motivated by
hate but by profit. In such cases, discrimination costs are passed to minorities. Furthermore banks
might 'rationally' discriminate against minorities who are economically equal to their white
counterparts, particularly young couples, on the basis that minorities have lower future income
levels. Helen F. Ladd presents a further example of discrimination practices following profit-
maximizing guidelines (Ladd, 1998). Savings and loan associations or other depository lenders gain
funds through the deposits of the local residents. If these local residents are prejudiced to the extent
that they would prefer if minorities did not share the same neighborhood, then it is unlikely they will
deposit their funds in institutions that are known to provide mortgages to minorities. Hence
institutions as such will cave into the prejudice of their customers, in order to maintain profït-
maximizing goals.
The asymmetric distribution of information can also encourage racial discrimination.
Informational problems regarding the credit worthiness of applicants between lending institutions
and prospective borrowers in white and minority communities might lead to potential redlining, as
shown by V/eiss and Stiglitz (1991).If banks are for any reason unable to distinguish between the
more promising borrowers, but think that loans on property within the minority communities are in
fact riskier, then they will not undertake any further lending actions in order to minimize any
potential risk. Two explanations exist regarding the riskiness of minority communities. Firstly stated
by Guttentag and V/achter (1980) their theory explains redlining due to 'neighborhood externalities
and information costs'. Their argument is based on the factthat in any residential community, o the
retum on lending depends on the total volume of lending there...[and] lenders concenÍrate their
lending where other lenders are making loans'. In other words, any prospective borrower requesting
a loan in an affluent neighborhood will be met with favorable circumstances, as the banker
understands the probabilities of the borrower repaying the loan are more than sufficient. In the same
manner prospective borrowers that request loans in minority neighborhoods will be perceived with
hesitation, as the banker from experience knows that loans in these areas are more likely to default
deeming them riskier. The second explanation was given by the same authors and suggests that when
it is costly to gather information on the borrower and statistics correlating racial and economic
characteristics are readily available, banks will 'rationally' use racial composition of the
neighborhood as a cheap screening process for prospective clients. For Kenneth Arow and Edmund
Phelps, unequal treatment is also a result of "statistical" discrimination; "that is, discrimination that
occurs because the lender finds it cheaper to use the characteristics of an applicant's group, such as
its race, to estimate the applicant's creditworthiness rather than the applicant's own past history"
(Arrow, l973,Phelps, 1972). By Arrows definition, discrimination will not be driven away by the
existence of a competitive market.
Helen Ladd (1998) presents further evidence that support the notion that lenders statistically
discriminate against minorities while also maintaining profits. "Lenders might believe, for example,
that discrimination against minorities in the labor market could make the income of minorities more
volatile on average... and hence make minorities more likely to default." Thus again, race is shown
to be a cheap tool used as a screening process to distinguish between applicants.
To summar ize: thetheoretical models of discrimination in the housing and credit market have
underlined three causes of discriminatory procedures.
'L) Personøl dßcrímínation (bígott-u): racially differential outcomes that are due to racial
preferences unrelated to economic factors.
(2) RationøI dßcrìminøtíon: racially differential outcomes that arise when agents use race or
characteristics correlated with race to make valid statistical inferences about the distinct market
prospects of different racial groups.
(3) Structurøl dßcriminøtion: racially differential outcomes that arise because of identifiable
economic factors associated with the agents or properly involved.' (Dymski, 2002)
Suppose a number of minorities and whites are all prospective applicants for a limited
number of loans. The lender will make the decision on whom to lend to, based on their current
wealth level and their predicted future income. In the case that minorities have lower wealth levels
than the whites, then they are structurally discriminated against. If on the other hand their level of
wealth is equal to that of the whites, they are rationally discriminated on the basis that the
prospective income of minorities on average is lower than whites. Thus (2) focuses on anticipated
disparities while (3) on existing disparities.
. It is clear that the discriminatory theory on the.housing market has evolved throughout the
years. Becker 's relatively simple model has been questioned constantly since it was firstly
published. The above theories suggest that discrimination will not in fact disappear by itself and
there is indeed a need for outside control and monitoring. Nevertheless, the economic theories
developed independently of the legal context that \¡/as presented, creating an imaginary void between
the empirical work and the legal framework. To the current day discriminatory behavior cannot be
perfectly identified as the argument that certain minority applicants are accompanied with worse
economic fundamentals than their white counterparts. Furthermore, new discriminatory practices
have been introduced and have evolved, an example being the recent phenomenon of predatory
lending and will probably continue to evolve in the future. It is thus detrimental to identi$ and
contextuali ze thelypes of discrimination.present as each one is combated and addressed differently.
Empirical studies on redlining and discrimination in the credit markets have been mostly
inconclusive due to the following reasons:
a) Data restrictions that preclude statistical study of inequality in certain credit
markets.
Ambiguous legal and theoretical defïnitions of discrimination (Dymski, 2002)b)
Furthermore researchers have recently suggested that the changing strucfure of the banking
and lending market may possibly affect the results drawn from studies of discrimination. As the
banking system is constantly re-organizing its strucfures, the character of mortgage-based
discrimination is changing with it. The recent wave of mergers in the industry due to intensified
competition has been forcing banks to shut down smaller branches, especially in minority
neighborhoods, which in furn, increases structural discrimination.
The Federat leserye B
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conducted one of the leading studies in the fïeld of
mortgage discrimination and redlining in 1996. The study was a major breakthrough in the field as,
instead of testing the hypothesis of whether redlining is occurring by conholling the characteristics
of a neighborhood, they examined the role of the racial composition of the neighborhood by
controlling for race. Furthermore, the study stood out since it included vital variables to the mortgage
lending process that were omitted in previous studies. In cooperation with other regulatory agerrcies
they collected a large sample of mortgage applications in the Boston MSA in order to collect data
including all, available information on neighborhood, personal and property characteristics.
le
Denial Rates
otal by racc
White applicants lTb/o 17% l0%
Minorir¡1 applicanß 24o/o 33o/o ZSVI
Total bv haot 12% 3I%
*'i'-: a -'-:1.
The study relied partly on the 1990, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for the
Boston Mehopolitan Statistical Area. The table above, which was produced through the HMDA data
only, indicates that minority applicants generally face an almost three times higher chance of being
denied a loan as compared to their white counterparts. Specifically, it also indicates that applicants in
minority tracts also face a three times higher chance of being denied a loan when compared to
applicants in white areas. Most importantly however for the time being, was the fact that both whites
and minorities faced a higher chance of being denied if the properfy was located in a minority tract,
as the traditional redlining theory predicts. This general pattern of loan refusal among minorities
however was heavily scrutinized since the HMDA data set only includes one important economic
variable, income. 2 Since it only includes income, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston gathered
additional data on 38 additional variables from the lender's fïles by adding an extensive follow up
survey to the HDMA data set. Several variables were taken from credit reports and propefy
appraisals while additional variables were chosen after extensive conversations with mortgage
underwriters and brokers. Variables and measures such as'the ratio of housing eJcpense to income,
the ratio of total debt to income, the stabiliry of the applicant's employment, the applicant's
commitment to debt repayment,'as measured by credit history; the loan-to-value ratio, the presence
of private mortgage insurance, and the stability of the value of the mortgaged properly and
characteristics of the property, such as single-famíly versus multifamily units' were included.
t pg. 5 Boston Fed
Information on neighborhood characteristics such as median income in tract, and the according
variables were taken from the Census data as a supplementary source of informátion. The Census
data were also used in order to calculate the racial composition of the tracts (Tootell, 1996).
Their result show that lenders do not discriminate on the basis of the rucialcomposition of the
tact, 'although they may discriminate based on the race of the applicant.' In order to isolate the
effect the individual race of an applicant might have on the decision making process from the racial
composition of the tract where the applicant resides, their regression to predict the probability of the
applicant being approved for a mortgage, included both the individual characteristic of the race as a
variable and a combination of variables which are mentioned further below, to calculate the racial
composition of the tract. By doing so, they manage to capture the effect of the race of the applicant
while accounting for the tract's characteristics. This means that any evidence of discrimination will
be capturing the effect of the race only, and not the effects of omitted variables that are correlated
with tract characteristic, since those are included in the regression. In fact, in contrast with previous
studies that have resulted in concluding that tract-specific characteristics such as racial composition
affect the mortgage lending process, the Federal Reserve has found no evidence that the racial
composition of the tract is significant in the lending process. Furthermore, the study provided
evidence that opposed the notion of lenders redlining in a racial way. Redlining could be possibly
based on other tract specific characteristics that do not include its racial composition. Tracts with a
higher rate of vacancy and boarded up propefy naturally face higher rejection rates independently of
the race of inhabitants In order to account for the possibility thatttactspecific characteristics have an
effect on the decision making process, they added to the base equation tract variables such as 'the
rent-to- value ratio for properly in the area, the median income level of households in the
neighborhood, and the vacancy and boarded-up rates in the tract.' Nevertheless the presence of these
variables did not affect the results on discrimination and redlining, since both variables that measure
the effect of the racial composition of the tract are still insignificant.
"Areas appear to be redlined only because they are inhabited by minorities; if more whites
moved into minority neighborhoods, the rate of lending in these areas would tend to
increase"(Tootell 1996). When testing the hypothesis that minority areas are being redlined, they
expected to see higher rejection rates in these areas even after contolling for any variables that might
affect the rejection rates. Indeed, the coefficients on both variables of minority area status indicate
that applications originating from minority tracts have a 6 percent higher chance of being denied than
similar applications from.white areas. This is in fact evidence of red-lining occurring. Nevertheless,
when the race of the applicant was included as a controlled variable, as in an attempt to isolate any
possible redlining of minority areas, the coefficient of lender redlining became completely
insignificant, while the coefficient that measures race is significant in all equations. This result
indicates that lenders only seemed to redline before, since race had an effect in both the mortgage
lending process and in the racial composition of the tract. This is evidence that racial discrimination
is occurring but not based on the racial composition of the neighborhood.
Tootell also tested the possibility of indirect forms of redlining. Private mortgage insurance
, 
(PMÐ is a critical aspect conhibuting to the mortgage decision since almost all applications that fail
to acquire PMI usually also fail to be approved for the loan and all applications that do in fact
acquire it, pay more for the actual loan. Essentially PMI is acquired by the borrower in order to
protect the lender's interests in case of asset price deflation or possible costs in case of fo¡eclosure.
The hypothesis tested by Tootell takes the following form:'Since PMI is costly, if applications for
loans on properties in minority tracts, or from minorities, are more tikely to be forced to acquire
PMI, the redlining, or discrimination, would be in terms of price rather than action taken.' In order to
observe if minorities are pushed towards the purchase of PMI more aggressively than their white
counterparts, it is essential to first outline what determines whether a borrower is required to
purchase a PMI in the first place. In most cases, PMI is demanded when the down payment is less
than 20 percent of the expected value of the properly and the loan will be sold in the secondary
market. If the loan is held in the bank's portfolio though, applicants might be required to purchase
even if the down payrhent is greater than20 percent. Furthermore, the móst important determinant of
whether PMI is demanded is whether the loan-to-value ratio is greater than 80 percent.' Finally a bad
credit score or mortgage history will increase one's chances of being requested to purchase PMI.
Tootell's findings result in evidence that indicate that possible discrimination present in the
decision to acquire PMI 'raises concenm about whether the variable in the base regression indicating
that PMI was denied is masking.redlining in the mortgage lending decision.' In other words any
evidence of discrimination in mortgage denials is also contained in the PMI denials. Although there
is little to no evidence from this study that suggest that the rccial composition of a tract might have
an effect on the mortgage lending decision, there are some results that prove that whether one will be
requested to apply for a PMI can depend on the customer's tract racial composition.
Since there is enough evidence that indicates that the race of the applicant might directly
affect the decision behind mortgage lending, one could possibly conclude that this study has
successfully proven the existence of discriminatory practices in the mortgage market. On the other
hand, one could also interpret the positive coefficient on the race variable, as evidence of something
else. Firstly, omitted variables that arc correlated with both the race of the applicant and the decision
making of a mortgage process might still exist. Secondly, statistical discrimination might be the
leading cause of the higher denial rate of mortgage applications by minorities since race could be
used as a proxy for loan profitability. In other words statistical discrimination occurs if the following
is true: 'If the default rate þr minorities, holding all else in the lender's information set constant, ís
higher than the rate for whites, statistical díscrimination could produce a signiJicant race cofficient
in the denial equation'(Tootell, 1996).
The afore-mentioned two points would be valid counterarguments to the study only if Tootell
had not predicted and expected them, as a close look of his data set showcases that no important
variables have been omitted. Furthermore, although Tooteell's data were not intended to identiff
potential statistical discrimination, 'what information they do contain concerning this issue does not
justiff the conclusion that raôe's use as a signal of a higher conditional default probability, explains
the size and significance of its role in the mortgage lending decision.' By creating the likelihood of
defaulting on other forms of debt, as a function of race and almost every other personal variable of
every individual applicant using the applicant's credit history as the dependent variable, if statistical
discrimination was indeed occurring then the coefficient of race should not be significant. Their
findings however, produced a significant coeffrcient even after controlling for default rates. The
positive coefficient indicates thus that there is no form of statistical discrimination occurring in the
data set. This debate however is purely theoretical since in any case the form of discrimination
should not matter from an enforcement point of view since all are illegal.
The Federal Reserve study provided the most insightful information on the matter of
discrimination in the mortgage market and specifically on the practice of redlining; an extremely
widely applied .practice that was almost legal at certain times. This practice though, had begun
already disappearing at the time Tootell first published his findings. Nevertheless they were quite
innovative. An emphasis was placed on how the racial composition of a tract plays a role in redlining
by controlling for the race of the borrower. It appears that the racial composition of the tract does not
in fact have adirect impact on the lending decision. It is the race of the applicant, Tootell findings
suggest, that produces the reluctance of lenders to provide lines of credit to minorities independently
of the community rccialcomposition of the tract that minorities happen to live in. The findings were
specifically important as then, bank regulation revolved around tract-specific characteristics, like it's
racial composition and not the race of the applicant itself and how it might be related to the mortgage
lending decision. Furthermore its findings \ryere so fundamental to the current understanding of
mortgage market discrimination because they were so strongly supported. Studies of mortgage
lending are usually scrutinized since they come hand in hand with serious limitations.
Firstly, most studies on this subject have encountered problems in acquiring a complete set of
variables since most of them rely primarily on the I-IMDA data set, which only includes one
important characteristic about the applicant, 'income'. Lenders on the other hand place much more
focus on a combination of variables, which are not included in the HMDA data set. To overcome this
fundamental limitation, the Federal Reserve collected 38 additional variables for a sample of
applications in the Boston MSA. To calculate the racial composition of the tract Census data was
used. Any variables that could not be collected through these two data sets were gathered from credit
reports, lender's worksheets and through extended conversation with mortgage loan officers and
mortgage underwriters; 'the fact that they all felt the survey was far too inclusive is one indicator of
its thoroughness. Thus the argument that there might be omitted variables that produce the
significance in the racialcoefficient cannot be supported in this paper since it includes an incredible
amount of data sources and variables.
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(Tootell, 1996).
The mortgage market however has evolved rapidly since this publication and even more since
the years when redlining was actively taking place. The development of the mortgage market also
brought \Mith it the development of other discriminatory practices. While the findings of the Fed
study \¡/ere detrimental to the understanding of how redlining had been fiansformed through the
years, they were only relevant to that,the discriminatory practice of redlining, which had already
started disappearing in the early 1990's. Numerous other practices have evolved throughout the
years and the incentives behind them vary considerably than the incentives of the discriminatory
practices that occurred in the past. Practices that, unfortunately in a way, had not been observed at
the point of time when the Federal Reserye conducted this study and unfortunately as well, have not
been as thoroughly analyzed as the practice of redlining, since no study that meticulous has been
produced in the recent years. My next chapter is going to analyzehow the mortgage market evolved,
specifically how the creation of two govefitment-sponsored enterprises of Fannie Mae and Freddie
t\,¡tsnof
Mac created the process of securitization and how this process, has given rise to new discrimination
practices and new incentives behind any potential discrimination. Specifically, how the rapid
technological advances in the mortgage market created opportunities and accessibility to a much
wider spectrum of mortgage products. The increasing demand and the large number of new potential
customers combined with the technological advancements of the time, introduced the use of
algorithms in the decision making process to supposedly better the conditions under which loans are
approved or u¡derwritten. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the financial instruments and
mortgage specific details that came with the creation of the G.S.E's introduced new agents the
decision making process, whose interests do not always align with that of the consumers. These two
fundamental factors gave rise to predatory lending, a practicewhich has been solely observed in the
secondary market.
Chapter 2
The Evolution of the Mortgage Market
The home mortgage market has been reshaped since the deregulation acts of the 1980s, when
the banking system consisted of segmented markets. At that point of time commercial banks rarely
issued mortgages. Savings and loan associations collected household deposits that would finance
home mortgages, which were often underwritten by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
'When these institutions suffered from high default rates and 'an interest rate mismatch between
short-term deposits and long-term fixed-rate mortgages', the two govemment-sponsored enterprises,
(GSE)-Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Federal l-Iome Loan Mortgage Corp) vastly expanded the
MBS(mortgage backed ,securities) market. Thesç two institutions had established the secondary
market for mortgages. Due to their small line of credit from the Department of Treasury, these GSE's
were perceived as being completely supported by the federal government (Pickbrt, 200S). The GSEs
were øeated to provide mortgage securitization. They practically bought mortgages from lenders, in
order for lenders to lend out more money. They then packaged those mortgages in the form of
'agency'MBS (mortgage backed securities) and resold them. Private label MBS were also created
and were issued by investment banks. The specif,rcs of the process of securitization though, will not
be analyzed in this paper. Nowadays the GSE's purchase and securitize more than 90% of the
conventional mortgage market in the US. Since they hold the role of guarantors, they have
established a pricing grid, which determines the price of credit risk. This grid determines the price of
the default risk among different credit score and loan 
- 
to value buckets. Essentially it is the price
lenders are obliged to pay in order for the GSE's to absorb the risk of a potential default. Any
deviation from this pricing grid reflects the lenders incentive to increase profits. (Bartlett ,2019)
It is important nevertheless to understand that through the creation of the GSE's, the
mortgage market slowly evolved in a way that bluned incentives behind potential discrimination and
altered the forms and character of discriminatory practices. The funding for loans did not rely on
customer deposits anymore but on investments through mortgage backed securities. Non-depository
mortgage banks could now originate loans being only driven by the incentive to sell them in the
secondary market. The secondary market developed in a way that mortgage bankers, brokers and
thrifts collected a fee for originating loans, but at the same time they also transferred loans to the
GSEs, The issuers of these securities then assumed the credit risk on the mortgages.(Ladd, 1998). In
many cases the originator of the loan did not end up servicing the loan he had originated. Thus one
can assume that the discriminatory incentives of the originator have changed, as not only he is
rewarded for the maximum amount of mortgages he can approve, but is also stripped of any
responsibilify in case of default. Discriminatory practices have thus evolved and adapted to the
changes of the mortgage market, and have not disappeared as other papers have suggested.
The rapid expansion of the secondary mortlage market and the financial deregulation in the
1980's that allowed smaller scale banks and thrifts to merge and broaden their activities lead to the
massive development of banking institutions. As certain banks reached a national scale and were
competing in a market of multiple financial products for millions of customers, centralized databases
and data-processing facilities were hugely invested in. 'As a result this shifted the informational
basis of loan making from personal knowledge to standardized assessments.' (Dymski, 2013) This is
another aspect in the evolution of the mortgage market that has blurred discriminatory incentives.
The way unequal treatment takes place has evolved parallel to the transformation of the mortgage
market.
In the past mortgage lenders were clearly discriminating against specific borrowers and in
pafithat was the result of policy guidelines. Documents prove that mortgage originators during the
1970's, often discounted a wife's income by almost 50% during the evaluation process of the
mortgage. As mortgage originators use a formula that takes into consideration a combination of
variables such as income, and believe that the percentage of family income spend on housing is an
essential determinant of loan risk, by omitting a percentage of the wife's income, families are offered
a much smaller loan, or none at all.
According to theory, lenders usually omit a major percentage of the wife's income as they
assume them to be íe-porary workers. If the wife's income was to be counted as a whole when
determining the percentage of income the family is able to spend on housing then in a case of
childbearing, the farnily's ability to keep up with mortgage payments would supposedly be impaired.
This economic justification for the wife's income being omitted is widely focused on, whenever
advocates of equal rights for women speak up. Dennis Kendig, in his study on discrimination against
women provides two reasons on why this economic justification does not in fact rest on any
economic theory. "First, the probability of delinquency or default is not particularly sensitive to the
percent of income devoted to housing expense. Second, the income of a working wife cannot in the
majority of cases be expected to shrink or evaporate during the early years of the mortgage (Kendig,
1973). In fact several studies have proved that the percentage of family income spent on housing is
not a reliable determinant of the family's ability to pay off the loan. According to a study by John
Herzog and James Earley for the National Bureau of Economic Research the most important factors
taken into consideration when calculating the potential risk of a borrower is loan-to-value ratio
(Herzog, Early 1970).In other words it not evident at allthat the wife's income being calculated as a
whole will inuease the probability of default if the wife stops working Furthermore, studies have
also shown that the assumption that the wife's income being terminated in the first years of the
mortgage affects a substantial number.of working women that do not plan on becoming mothers.
Pregnant households specifically faced a reduced access to mortgage loans and although there
is not enough empirical research on the topic of family-structure discrimination, it is widely
suggested that mortgage lenders were far more hesitant to approve loan applications of pregnant
households. Kending's results do in fact show evidence pinpointing to the existence of widespread
discrimination against women.
Currentþ, though the presence of discrimination should have been eliminated theoretically
due to the different anti-discrimination bills and laws that have been established, such as the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) (1g74)and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. As mentioned before, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act made it illegal for'oany creditor to discriminate against any applicant,
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, age." The Fair Housing Act of 1968, prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental
or financing of a house based on race, religion or sex. Furthermore, it seems that the bigoted
mentality that ruled over the banking institutions and the mortgage market in general, has
disappeared over the years, or it is not as easily expressed as it punishable by law. The changing
structure of the mortgage market should also be considered, for reasons explained above, as 'lending
institutions are unlikely to forego profits as the price of implementing discrimination' as they did in
the past and as Beckerjs pioneering theory on discrimination suggests (Ladd, 199S). Thus, is it even
plausible that banking institutions still discriminate against minorities? Despite the several anti-
discrimination regulations in combination with the civil rights movement, Moreover, wouldn't the
development of the mortgage market in a mechanism that encourages loan originators to approve as¡
many mortgages as possible practically blur the incentives for discriminating to such extent that it is
almost unreasonable to discriminate against minorities? It seems that if bigoted lenders tried to deny
housing lbans to any minorities nowadays, they would be met with loss of profits in comparison to
their competitor, and then be held accountable in a court of law. That unfortunately would only be
the case in a perfect world.
Firstly, even though U.S legislation against discrimination has been widely supported and
established is it unrealistic to expect that all cases of potential discrimination are being brought to
light. Not all cases of potential mortgage discrimination are reported and the ones that are reported
do not always end with the victim being justified. Furthermore, the desire for increased profitability,
which came hand in hand with the development of the mortgage market (mortgage brokering became
highly profitable during the 1990's and 2000's) gave rise to new types of discrimination and new
incentives behind them. Discriminatory practices have evolved in ways that do not require profit-
sacrificing motives to support them. Predatory lending and algorithm-based discrimination are
examples of such practices. Furthermore, in many cases, lending institutions use the applicant's race
as a cheaper screening process than the other more formal, established but more costly processes.
Thus in a world of imperfect information this can be viewed as a legitimate profit-maximizing
process. Even though screening processes have shifted nowadays from the mortgage broker's
personal assessment of the applicant,to an algorithmic analysis of the applicant's variables, studies
have found that disøimination is still very present. Professor Adair Morse said that 'the mode of
lending discrimination has shifted from human bias to algorithmic bias'(Bartlett, Morse, 2019). His
study found that certain pricing disparities between otherwise similar applicants are the result of
algorithms targeting applicants 'who might shop around less for highly-priced loans, 'meaning
minorities with not enough access to financial services who are forced to agree to any terms they are
first presented with. Finally the changing incentives of providing as many loans as possible have
given a rise to anbther form of disuimination compatible with profit-maximizing, predatory lending.
In order to understand the role played by race in the mortgage lending decision, it is essential
to first outline the process of acquiring a mortgage and then describe the economic factors that could
possibly have an effect on that final decision. Secur itization and the revolutions in the financial
market have transformed this process. Until a few decades ago the process oiy involved the
borrower applying for a loan from a conventional depository institution such as a bank or a savings
and loans association and the lender's only responsibility was to decide whether to approve it or not
and hold it until maturity. As the secondary mortgage market evolved, responsibilities and
incentives were reshaped as well. New players emerged in the mortgage market and their incentives
are not perfectly aligned with that of consumers, especially minorities. As previously mentioned the
newly introduced mechanism rewards sales of high volumes of loans. The up-front fee mortgage
loan originators receive, has resulted in an almost indifferent attifude towards the risk of borrowers
defaulting. Investment banks and other institutions involved in securiti zation, engage in due
diligence that is not designed to protect customers (Engel 20ll). Thus there might be possible
discrimination along the channel of acquiring a mortgage. This channel one has to go through to
acquire a mortgage will be described below.
Mortgage Decision Making Process
When an individual applies for a loan which is classed as 'conforming', meaning it falls
below the federally-set conforming loan limit, a process begins with the GSE, whereby the lender
provides application observables such as the applicant's credit score, liquid reserves, income, debt-
to-income ratio, properly value loan-to-value ratio, , etc. into the GSE's 'black box'. This is an
automated underwriter system using Desktop underwriter for Fannie Mae and Loan Prospector for
Freddie Mac. Based on a specific set of observables, an oaccept or reject' decision is reached. If the
loan is accepted and actualizedthe mortgage is then sold to the GSE. The lender is compensated with
a cash transfer. The loan is then packaged with a group of mortgages with a similar property value
into a mortgage backed security (MBS), a default-risk guarantee is issued on the product and it is
sold to the MBS market. For a period of 30 days the lender holds some credit risk but after that time
the lender is not exposed to any pre-payment or default risk. He is however, exposed to put-back
risk. This is when the documentation accompanying the loan such as the IRS form, credit score
information or when loan purpose, for. example, residential or commercial, is falsified or absent.
After the financial crisis of 2008, 'because of put-backs and large fines for misrepresentation, lenders
ceased no-documentation GSE loans and adjusted their policies to remove the potential for
falsifi cation' (Bartlett, Morse 2019).
Furthermore, within the GSE process the lender is faced with three important decisions
regarding the pricing of the mortgage since the interest rate that is assigned to the potential
homeowners is the product of several factors. Firstly, all mortgages face an identical market price to
capital,which is determined by the Base Mortgage Rate. The BMR reflects the primary interest rate
on all mortgages that are to be purchased by the GSE's. Essentially, the BMR o'reflects the
compensation demanded by investors in the MBS market"(Bartlett, Morse 2019). The second
component that determines pricing is a 'guarantee fee' that is paid to the GSE's by the lenders to
cover potential default and operational costs. The amount of this fee varies accordingly to the credit
risk of customers across the GSE grid also knows as the Loan Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)
The rates that the originators are quoting have incorporated both the Base Mortgage Rate(reflected
as the par rate) as well as the LLPA adjustments(reflected in the form of 'hit' to the par rate). The
third pricing component that might affect quoting rates depends on the lenders competition
environment of a location, since in cases of deserted financial environments lenders might follow a
monopolistic pricing. There have been numerous studies that reflect such practices where lenders
specifically target customers with limited financial accessibility in order to quote higher rates.
(Bartlett, Morse 2019 ).
Origination Channel
Loan originators such as depository institutions, mortgage banks etc. a¡e the main bodies
responsible for extending credit to borrowers. Nevertheless, loans can.also originate through thrifts
or smaller community banks. In the majority of scenarios "lenders reach out to potential customers,
take mortgage applications, and underwrite and fund loans for those who meet their underwriting
standards; once funded a retail 1o arL may be held in a portfolio by the lender or packaged and sold on
the secondary market"(Apgar 2005). Intermediaries between the borrower and the originator such as
mortgage brokers are also usually involved. These brokers help borrowers äcquire credit and can
supposedly play a crucial role in matching ttrem with well-termed loans. Since, mortgage products
are of a certain complexity, it is reasonable that many consumers could potentially benefit from the
services of such intermediaries. The issue is though, that most brokers do not act in the borrower's
interest. This is because their profit-maximizing incentives are not aligned with the interests of
borrowers, meaning that brokers can maximize their personal compensation at the expense of the
borrowers they represent. Brokers receive origination fees from the borrower at the time the loan is
funded and are rewarded by the number of customers they have matched with lenders. Once they are
compensated by the lender in the case of a successful loan, they lose all long-term interest in the
performance of the loan. Thus brokers become immune to the potential consequences of their
actions. Furthermore, lenders also benefit from using intermediaries, as they avoid direct
involvement with the borrowers, which 'insulates lenders from consumer litigation' (Engel, 20ll).
Mortgage originators are assumed to follow profit 
- 
maximizing incentives. In order for
profit maximization to be achieved one would have to maximize the difference between the expected
retum on the mortgage and the costs of the funds to a lender. The expected retum on the mortgage
depends on the interest rate charged and the probability the mortgagor defaults. As all mortgage
applications are accepted at the market nte, it is evident that 'expected profit maximization depends
almost exclusively on granting mortgages that minimize the probability of and costs to default
(Munnell, Tootell, 1996). The probability of the borrower defaulting depends on a variety of
variables such as personal characteristics and loan variables, which the mortgage lender considers in
order to estimate the probability. Thus if one is to.understand the impact of race in mortgage
acquiring process one has to control for all variables in the lender's information set. Income years of
education, size of the mortgage are all basic variables to be considered, and while they do affect the
decision making process, there are other more technical variables that are more essential in such
processes. Net wealth, liquid assets, housing expenses relative to income and total debt payment
obligations relative to income are examples of such variables.
For a more descriptive and specific analysis of the origination channel, it is fundamental to
look into the existing case studies of lenders. Specifically the Urban Institute has produced a detailed
account ofthe origination process, based on one case study ofa lender. In their study they look into
the behavior of a lender, a mortgage company that is fully owned by a builder who develops housing
for low- middle- and upper income households. This mortgage company operates in a large city with
a substantial number of black and Hispanic residents, producing roughly 1000 mortgages per year
valued at almost seventy million. The description of the process however is derived from the point of
view of the actual lender and not of the Urban Institute. The proces, ,r.urrth"less is still scrutinized
by the Institute.
All employees of the lender that were interviewed claimed that they are heavily committed to
treating every customer fairly. They also claimed that it makes no sense from a profit-making and a
business point of view to furn customers away. The lender however does not provide fair lending
training to the employees and only includes a single paragraph describing fair lending guidelines in
their procedure manual. They have also been accused for discriminatory practices by minority
customers in the past although the lender was never found to be liable
In any case, the lender's origination process (figure 1) follows a'teamapproach' in deciding
the final result of an application in order to restrict any employee's power of deciding individualty.
According to the lender, oa loan counselor, a processor, the branch manager, and the underwriter or
president, use as much creativity as possible to qualiff applicants (Turner, Skidmore 1999). Loan
applications are also discussed in.weekly meeting in the .presence of several decision-making
employees in order to discuss strategies that can potentially better the chances of marginal applicants
qualiffing.
The initial loan application process begins with the eustomçr completing a hard-copy
application in which they provide personal characteristics such as income, employment history,
existing debts, and other relevant information. The loan counselor then enters the information into an
electronic version of the form. This application also requires the applicants to declare their race and
according to the lender's staff 'this information is never used in the origination decision process. It
does however follow under the "disclosure information' category which is required by the loan
counselors at the end of the initial application.
As the initial application interviews comes to an end the counselor requires the customer to
provide seventy five dollars for his credit report and is told that they will be in touch after the credit
report is examined. The research team of the Institute indicates that the loan counselors do not
forecast potential results with the customer. Once the customer leaves, the counselors add comments
on the digitalized version of the application regarding the customer's characteristics such as his
income past employment, credit history etc. These comments according to the counselors do not
allow for subjective feelings about the customer. Since they are accessible to everyone in the
company they are mostly meant to provide information to the underwriter or the branch manager
about any financial issues that might need attention. After the comments are added both the
digitalized and the hard-cop! of the applications are send to a branch manager who collects all the
available variables and secures the documentation that is useful before sending the application to the
underwriter.
The underwriter of this mortgage company evaluates the application by personally examining
all the relevant information of the file and not through an automated underwriting system like most
of the underwriters use today. According to her own words she tries to apply the underwriting
guidelines in the most flexible way possible. She also added that the applicant's race never enters
into her decision making process nor that she possesses knowledge of what percentage of minorities
have been approved for a loan. Nevertheless an individual underwriter is unable to dictate the final
decision since 'all conditional approvals are transmitted by letters reviewed and signed by the
president' (Tumer, Skidmore lggg).It is evident thus that the final decision on whether the loan is to
be approved or not is not the responsibility of a single individual but is rather a team based process
that requires input from a ntrmber of different employees
Almost three-quarters of the mortgages originated by the company have to follow the
underwriting standards of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration
(VA), and Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). This has a direct impact in the level of strictness
these underwriting guidelines have to follow since these govemment administrations are much more
flexible towards underwriting standards than conventional mortgages. Even though the afore-
mentioned mortgage company does not service any of the mortgages it originates, it holds an
incentive to underwrite using conservative guidelines, since they are responsible in case of the
customer defaulting, for up to 4 months, in the case of conventional loans. The same applies for
government loans, which are sold to the two GSE's, although the lender is only responsible for a
month after the mortgage has been sold. The FHA furthennore audits a sample of mortgage files
submitted to make sure that underwriters of the company indeed comply with its standards.
From the above description of mortgage decision making, one could possible imply that the process
has been transformed over the years in order to counter for any potential discriminatory practices
The afore-mentioned mortgage company for example, claims that discriminatory practices are
countered through the introduction of a team-based approach in the decision-making process. On the
other hand there are so many new agents introduced, both within the framework of mortgage
originators, and also outside of it, as in the afore-mentioned case of mortgage brokers, who carry
.responsibilities not onþ related to the final approval of the mortgage but also to the specifics of the
loan. Furthefinore, the rapid expansion of the secondary market has introduced a number of
additional agents as well, that can indirectly affect the decision making process. The specific roles
and responsibilities of these agents are discussed below. (see Fig., 1)
FÍgure l, lander's originatÍon process
referral
-builder
---spot loan
initial loan applícation
intervlew with loan counselor
-confirms prodgct recommendation
--€nters application ¡nto cornputer system
-requests credit report
proossSor
-revievys credit report
-gåthers documentation
branch manager
reviêw¡ file with loan
team
in-house
underwriter
outslde
und€rwriter
loan commlttee
underwrlter
president
conditional approval letter
follow-up by
losn counselor
few problems many problems
(Turner, Skidmore 1999).
Agents of the Secondary Mortgage Market
Assignees
Assignees are the entities that own the loans after they have been purchased from the loan
originators. In some cases assignees are arrangers (see further below) who briefly own the loans that
are in the process of securi tization and in most cases, assignees are the husts that finance the
securities issued to loan originators and investors. Supposedly, assignees have a certain liability in
the origination process since they can 9ut off financing to loan originators or intermediaries that
commit unlawful practices during that process. Specifically, assignee liability refers to 'the liability
of owners of loans for any unlawful origination practices of an originator or intermediary who helps
a borrower to obtain a mortgage' (Engel & Fitzpatnck 2010). Unfortunately existing antiquated
laws such as the 'holder in due course' doctrine, limit this liability. This issue is going to be analyzed
fully in my last chapter.
Arrangers
Arrangers are bodies whose responsibilities are to package the loans into bundles for sale as
asset.backed seourities. They only own the loans for usually a short period of time during the
purchase of the loan and the point it's securitized. Their actions bear some exposr¡re to liability in
case they are found to be involved in unlawful activities during the origination of the loan. Even
though there are only a small number of cases where affangers have been found accountable for
unlawful conduct, their role in discriminating or in participating in other similar activities is
controversial. Is it in fact their responsibility to keep discriminatory practices or abuses out of the
mortgage market even when they do not themselves participate in them? The controversy lies behind
the fact that arrangers could possibly enable bad actors by 'funding them through loan purchases'
(Engel 2010). They can also affect the process of loan origination by 'directly informing originators
of the types of loans they are willing to buy and indirectly through the loans they actually purchase.'
(Engel &. Fitzpatrick 2010). Arangers could thus possibly play a role in enabling or participating in
discriminating practices in the mortgage origination process. Consequently, as all these players are
now involved in the process of mortgage origination it is possible that discriminatory practices exist
in all levels of this process, or only in some.
The evolution of the mortgage market through the rapid expansion of the secondary market,
has not only inhoduced new agents in the decision-making process but also new forms of
discriminatory practices as well. The inhoduction of complicated variables and loan-specific terms
that are not easily comprehendible by the average borrower, the fact that mortgage originators have
of the option not to service the loan they origin ate, the relatively new role of arrangers in the
secondary market in affecting the decision making process at the origination level, are all factors that
have influenced the nature of discriminatory practices.
Modern Types of DiscrimÍnation
Predatory Lending
Over the recent years a new type of discriminatory practice has been created by lending
institutions, 'predatory lending'. It is the most notorious form of modern discrimination in the
subprime mortgage ma¡ket. IVhile subprime lending is not synonymous with predatory lending,
such practices are rarely presented in the prime market (Renuart 2004), as "competition among
lenders and greater standardi zationand simplicity of mortgage products" usually prevent it (Apgar
2005). However, identiSing predatory lending practices has been observed to be relativety difficult
since the secondary market is largely concerned with subprime lending. Subprime lending can be
described as lending which 'serves the market of borrowers whose credit histories would not permit
them to qualiff for a conventional 'prime' loan (Lehe 2010). 
,
The federal definition of predatory lending describes it as "engaging in deception or fraud,
manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair advantage of a
borrower's lack of understanding about loan term"(US Department of the Treasury 2000): The terms
ón predatory loans are either outright deceptive or the fees the borrowers are sùbjected to, are usually
disproportionate to the borrowers risk (Engel and McCoy 2002, Renuart 2004, FCIC 201,1). Another
definition characterizes predatory loans as 'a mismatch between the borrowers financial
circumstances, needs and objectives and the loan that the professional lender offers' (Ehrenberg,
zouL),Since there is not a universally accepted definition of predatory lending, some 'predatory' loan
terms seem more affordable than others, it is important to note that the term predatory lending covers
a vast variety of predatory practices. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)'identifies
the following as practices or terms that can potentially be predatory.
(l) abusivecollætionpractices;
(2) large balloon payments due at loan nra[¡rity,
acæmpanid by lower monlûly paymenb to disguise tüe
the loan;
whlch arc
tr¡e cost of
(3) encoua$ng bomowen to &fault on an existing lcia¡ in order to
rcfinanw all or part ofit wiü a new ono;
(4) qutty stipping scåemes, in which üc lendcr depleto tbe
bormwer's hone quity byrcpeatedly refinancing a loan and ryplyÍng
new feæ wiür ruh tansaction;
(5) loan fæs in excess of lhe arnount justified by thb cosls and risks
involvd;
(6) intercst rales in excess of the amout justifiod by riskdasd
pricíng calculatims;
(7) ftsud, dæeptiou, and abuse, wüich rnay include -inflating
property eprai$sls and dætoring loan applicalions and soülflncnt
documents";s
(8) high logl-to-wlue ratíos, which .effætively prohibit
homumcrs from $llling their hones" or filing bankruptcy'biürurt
losing their home'f '
(9) lurding without regard to bonower's ability to rEay, also knoun
ar asæt basd lendingf"
(10) loan Aipping, h which nrortgage originators refi¡urce lo¡ns
(ll) rranrlatory aúibation clauses that prevent predatory lending
victirns ûom suing for damages;
(t 2) pre-paymcnt penaltice;a!
(t3) refin¡ncing special subsidized mortgages that aæ favorsble to
borrowcrs lpith loans lüat offcr borrower¡ less oconomic benefit; .
(14) refinancing unsggured debt, suc!-as oredit c¡rd or medical debt,
using a borrowe,r's homc as collaûeral;"
(1 5) single-premium credit insurancc, which requires the bonower to
pay the total premium upûont as an additional amount financed in the
loan, thus raieing úe amount of inærestpaid
(16) spurious open-end loansa3 th¿t permit lenders io circumvcnt
statutory disclosu¡t requirernenls for closed+nd credit, including
HOEPA resbíctions discussed in Part II.A Í4fra, and bonowers' right
ofrescission;
(17) "steering" borrowere who qualiff for lower-cpst prime loans to
highæost suþrime loans; and
(18) yield-spread premiums that lenders pay to mortgage brokers
"based on the difference between the ach¡al interest rate on the loan
and the ¡ate the lenderwould have accepted on the loan given the rislcs
and costs involved'# which ince¡tivize tnortgage brõkers to steer
borrowers to higher cost loans.
According to Engel and McCoy, who grouped these predatory lending practices acÇording to
the different impact they can impose on consumers, predatory loans can fall under these categories.
'7) Loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers. 2) Harmful rent
seeking. 3) Loans involving fraud or deceptive practices. 4) Other forms of lack of transparency in
loans that are not actionable as fraud. 5) Loans that require borrowers'to waive meaningful legal
redress.' (Engel, McCoy, 2002).
The list proiided by the FDIC, combined with the categoÅzations made by McCoy illustrate
the numerous manifestations of predatory lending; the inherent complexities of the mortgage
products that arose from the recent development of the mortgage market have provided numerous
opportunities to lenders to exploit borrowers on the basis of increasing their financial gains.
Furthermore, these lists showcase the inherent difficulty in enforcing anti-predatory legislation since
the creativity of lenders in innovating varieties of predatory practices is apparent, something that is
going to be analyzed fully in my third chapter.
As mentioned above predatory practices are based on the assumption that certain financial
terminology is too complex for everyone to grasp. It seems however, that predatory practices
specifically target minority populations. Evidence has made it abundantly clear that the practice of
'reverse redlining' or in other words 'the targeting of African-American and Latino communities in
particular, for the marketing of subprime and predatory loans', \¡r/as a huge aspect of the expansion of
the subprime lending (Lehe, 20L0). The predatory lenders targeted minorities since throughout the
years they were shipped of equal housing opportunities and consisted of an easier 'target'due to
their higher probability of accepting the loan.
More specifically according to Canner in 1998, 'subprime and manufactured housing lenders
made up a fifth of all mortgages extended to lower 
- 
income and Latino borrowers, and a third of all
those made to African 
- 
American borrowers' (Canner, lggg).4 study of HDMA data by Bradford
(2002) resulted in African 
- 
Americans being twice as likely as whites to receive subprime loans,
while Hispanics were almost one and a half times more likely than whites. It is suggestive therefore,
from the above studies that minorities are in fact targeted through predatory lending. Nevertheless
most research and writing on this matter remains inconclusive, as academic research on predatory
lending is just emerging.
The predatory lending market can be described as a'push market' where lenders usually look
for specific customers, rather than wait for customers to look for mortgages on their own (Renuart
2004). Kellie Kim-Sung and Sharon Hermansons' study (2003) on the dual mofigage markets
support this claim. Their results show that 56% of the customers involved in broker-initiated
mortgages had been initially approached by a broker while only 24%o of borrowers reported they
initiated contact themselves. They also found that'ahigher share of broker-originated loans go to
African American borrowers (64%)than to white borrowers (38%),and broker-originated loans are
also more common among borrowers who are divorced or female. Furthermore, borrowers involved
in broker-originating mortgages are more likely to pay extra points and more likely to receive a loan
with a prepayment penalty. It is evident nevertheless that the role of brokers is specifically
important. This role is analyzed further below.
Engel and McCoy argue that alender's ideal target group is people disconnected from credit
markets who are generally uninformed about the best available products in the market. Creditors
targeted specifîc neighborhoods and demographic groups; unsuspected borrowers who they knew
could not possibly handle any future payments (Renuart 2004,FCIC 20Il). Several 'push' tactics that
were employed by lenders included, door-to-door solicitation among minorities and the elderþ, the
exploitation of community institutions such as churches to acquire potential customers and subprime
refinancing with loans much greater in amount than necessary (Renuart 2004; Powell 2009;
Hemandez 2012). Minorities were particularly targeted, since they have historically been denied
equal housing opportunities and were thus especially vulnerable to any potential 'offer'.
It is evident therefore, that there is a dual mortgage delivery system, which specifically
targets low -income minority consumers. These borrowers are offered specially tailored products
and mortgage lenders that are different than the credit sources available in higher 
- 
income markets.
(Apgar 2005) These different products often contain stricter terms than the prime loans in the
mainstream market, and these alternative mortgage originators are usually excluded from the existing
regulatory framework.
Algorithmic Based Discrimination and Statistical Discrimination
The idea that discrimination can occur even through the use of algorithm-based computer
programs was briefly mentioned before and is going to be analyzedindepth below. Robert Bartlett's
and Adair Morse's study on this.matter has provided insightful results and porhay.very important
knowledge on how algorithms are utilized in the mortgage market. In their effort to estimate the level
of discrimination their results showcase that the FinTech companies which used algorithmic based
loan origination are equally discriminatory towards minorities when compared to face-to-face
lenders. This is an important finding since the involvement of algorithms in the decision making
process or in the underwriting process supposedly decrease the probability of human biases affecting
these processes.
It is widely known that all different variations of consumer loan originations in the US are
becoming largely algorithmic. An evident example of this is the Rocket Mortgage of the platform
lender 'Quicken', the largest-volume mortgage product in the U.S. as of 2018. As mentioned before
this changing nature in the mortgage decision-making also affects the nature of discrimination in the
mortgage market. Discrimination is no longer concerned with bigotry and prejudice but with
illegitimate applications of statistical discrimination. Even if lenders do not have any racist feelings
towards their minority customers they can produce a disparate impact through the use of proxy
variables. Identi$ing illegitimate statistical discrimination however, in the modern era of
algorithmic-based mortgage decision-making is a controversial matter since potential evidence can
always be a product of an omitted variable (Bartlett, Morse 2019).'Legitimate' statistical
discrimination can arise since "some variables in a macro-fundamental model of repayment risk are
not observable" and by using observable proxies the lender can almost reconstruct the hidden
information. Specifically, lenders use proxy variables that reproduce disparate impact only if these
variables have a'legitimate business necessity'. The legitimate-business-necessity defense is very
common among lenders accused of participating in discriminatory practices. Thus in order to identifu
illegitimate applications of statistical discrimination where the use of proxy variables is not
supported by a legitimate business necessity, it is important to first outline what constitutes
legitimate uses of statistical discrimination and what does not.
Robert Bartlett describes three distinctive applications of statistical discrimination. '1,)
Scoring or pricing loans explicitly on credit ris,k møcro- fundatmental variables is legitimare. 2)
Scoring or pricing on a Biig Data variable that only correlates with ethnicity through hídden
fundamental variables is legitimate. 3) Scoring or pricing on a Big Data variable that has residual
correlation with e:thnicity after orthogonalizing to hidden fundamental credit risk vøriables is
illegitimate.( Bartlett, Morse 2ILg).In other words, using proxy variables to estimate the credit-
worthiness of the applicant, that are both correlated with ethnicity and with credit risk, is a
legitimate use of statistical discrimination. However, using proxy variables to price loans that are
correlated with ethnicity but not with the risk of defaulting, is an illegitimate application of statistical
discrimination. For example, using the high school of an applicant as a proxy variable that predicts
his hidden wealth, where wealth is correlated with the endowment variable in a credit-risk setting,
might produce disparate impact since high school is also correlated with ethnicity. Thus from a
researcher's point of view, identiffing illegitimate statistical discrimination requires a setting where
alI legitimate business necessity variables. are observable in order to successfully identifu
discrimination. (Bartlett, Morse 2019).
Their results were alarming. They found that Latin and African.American ethnic groups are
offered much stricter terms in mortgage loans when compared to their white counterparts.
Specifically, ethnic groups "pay a higher (5.6 bps) interest rate for purchase mortgages and about a
1-3 bps higher mortgage interest rate for refinance mortgages." Surprisingly the results also present
the fact that FinTech leaders discriminate at the same level when compared to traditional face-to-face
lenders (Bartlett, Morse 2019).
Chapter 3
Policy Review
'Measurements to Counter Algorithmic Discrimination and Disparate Impact
Mortgage discrimination practices have thus been transformed over the years as well as the
incentives behind them. Existing legal doctrine has been unable to keep up with the changes of the
mortgage market as it primarily chatlenges human prejudice in setting credit terms and provides little
to no insight on how to monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making process of today. The
few measurements that arc concerned with the algorithmic decision-making process do not in fact
affect the existing pricing disparities. The specifics of this notion will be analyzed below.
One very important tool of anti-discrimination policies is restricting the impact of certain
types of variables from the decision making process (Gillis, Spiess 2019). Typical protected
characteristics involve race and gender, and are not to be involved or used in the setting of the prices
since their use can easily produce disparate impact. Indeed several policies rely on the exclusion of
certain variables to prevent discriminati.on. The ECOA specifically states that "Except as provided
in the Act and this parto a creditor shall not take aprohibited basis into account in any system of
evaluating the creditworthiness of applicants." The FHA specifically prohibits discrimination in
housing based on the race, gender, national origin etc. 3
Although the variable exclusion is a central àspect of discrimination laws, enforcing it can be
difÏicult when the forbidden variable is physically observable to the decision maker. When a
3
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mortgage broker for example physically observes the potential borrower's race it is almost
impossible to conclude that the racial variable did not affect the decision-making process. Thus the
perceived advantage of an algorithmic decision making process is that it actually excludes protected
characteristics from the process. While this automated pricing produces increases transparency it also
comes with serious limitations. Studies have shown that the inclusion of forbidden variables will
actually decrease disparity, "particularly,when there is some measurement bias in the data" (Gillis,
Spiess 2019), and that the exclusion of a protected variable such as race from fitting the algorithm
has little to no effect to how the projected risk changes.
Theoretically the exclusion of a protected characteristic from the decision making process
would cancel any direct effect of such characteristic to the process, One would hope for example,
that excluding race from the algorithm reduces possible disparity in risk assessments between race
groups. Unfortunately this is not the case.
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The above diagram (Gillis, Spiess 2019) illushates that disparities can persist even if protected
variables are exoluded from the algorithmic decision making process. Figure two represents the
probability function of the predicted default rates. The middle graph reflects the dishibution of the
forecasted default rates when race is excluded from the algorithm. The graph on the left illushates
ttre distribution of the predicted default rates as created by "using the decision rule that included the
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group identity as an inpuf'. It is evident that even if race is excluded from the algorithmic decision
making process, pricing dispafities persist.
This is the case as there is the possibility of other variables that are correlated with race
existing and affecting the decision making process even after the variable of race itself is excluded. If
for example applicants of one group happen to have obøined fewer years of education on average,
then using education in the decision making process will result in different prices among the
different groups. The problem of the excluded variable being reconstructed from a combination of
other variables is especially evident in high-dimensional data sets where 'complex, highly non-linear
prediction functions are used (Gillis, Spiess 2019).
A potential solution to the problem of the protected variables having an indirect effect to the
decision making process would be to drastically expand the criteria surrounding input restrictions. If
other correlating variables are also excluded then this indirect effect might decrease. For example if
an applicant's education is highly correlated with his race then one would maybe want to exclude
years of education from the decision making process. Even though education is not directly
correlated with default rates, it has been used as a proxy for future profitability that has affected the
mortgage lending decision. A serious limitation to this solution though is the fact that there might be
several variables that are indeed correlated to race, but cannot be excluded as they are also correlated
directly to the probability of the applicant defaulting. One could possibly suggest that the only
variables that should be excluded should be the ones that are not logically connected to default rates,
but that solution has limitation itself, as there are almost countless variables that might be correlated
to default rates, and not all of them can be observed ( Gillis, Spiess 20lg).
Furthermore, it should also be considered that the actual effectiveness of excluding other
variables that are correlated with race to decrease potential pricing disparities is insignificant. The
figure on the right reflects the probability of default rates as calculated without taking into
consideration race and the ten most significantly correlating variables. It is evident that even after
excluding such variables pricing disparities still persist. In Big Data therefore, 'even, excluding those
variables than individually relate m'ost to the 'forbidden input' does not necessarily significantly
affect how much pricing outputs vary with say, nace' (Gillis, Spiess 2019).
Disparate impact in United St¿tes labor law refers to 'practices in employment, housing, and
other areas that adversely affect one group of people of a protected characteristic more than another,
even though rules applied by employers or landlords are formally neutral' (Gillis, Spiess 2019). Even
though the definition of disparate impact has been associated with unintentional discrimination, it is
unclear if its purpose is to deal with claims of discrimination where intentions are really hard to
identi$ or with claims where there were no intentions to begin with. Furtherrnore, there have been
several studies that have suggested that disparate impact is not only a theory of discrimination, but
also a tool or a proxy that contributes in identiSing disparate treatment, the practice of
discrimination that results from intentional actions. According to the Supreme Court in the case of
oTexas Department of Housing &, Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project',
"Recognition of disparate-impact liability under the FHA plays an important role in uncovering
discriminatory intent: it permits plaintifß to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus
that escape easy classification as disparate treatment." (Gillis, Spiess 2019)
Furthermore, biased variables also pose a serious limitation when trying to understand the
existing pricing disparities. A variable can be biased if it has been involved in some measurement
erïor, or it has become biased through the years because of historical bias (Gillis, Spiess 20Lg). A
simple example would be that one's income could possibly be correlated with race and gender
because of previous discrimination in the labor market, and one's credit history might have been
impacted by past discrimination in the credit market. In the case of a biased variable it would be
undesirable to exclude a protected variable since the inclusion of that variable may force the
'
algorithm to correct for the biased variable. For example credit scores have been criticized in the past
since they have been viewed as a more predictive measurement for certain groups while 'overlooking
indications of creditworthiness that are more prevalent for minority groups' (Gillis, Spiess 20L9).
One reason why this is occurring is because credit rating agencies discriminate between means of
acquiring credit, meaning that they favor customers that have received credit from mainstream
lenders such as depository banking institutions. Minority borrowers however tend to acquire credit
from financial institutions which are not considered 'mainstream lenders' and such a credit line
might be treated less fairly by credit rating agencies. In other words, 'the credit score may reflect the
particular measurement method of the agency rather than underlying creditworthiness in a way that is
biased against minorities' (Gillis, Spiess). If this is in fact the case, and the credit scores of minorities
are not considered of equal weight because they result from alternative lines of credit, then a lender
that uses credit score as a predicting variable for default would want to include race as a variable as
well, in order to distinguish credit scores among different ethnic groups, and in order to provide
equal weight in credit soores in the decision making process rimong different groups. Of course
including 'forbidden' variables in the algorithmic decision making to decrease discrimination
practices is a contradicting matter since the inputs are basically affected by disparate treatment and
the outputs by disparate impact. In the setting of algorithmic credit pricing though, 'including
forbidden characteristics could potentially allow for the mitigation of harm from variables that suffer
from biased measurement error' (Gillis, Spiess 2019). To conclude, despite potential weaknesses, the
introduction of algorithms in the decision making process of acquiring a mortgage has produced
incredible transparency when compared to the human-based decision making of the past, as it
provides automated pricing, existing legislation that prohibits the use of protected variables from the
decision making process will have little to no effect in reducing existing pricing disparities.
In the past, and specifically during a period shortly before the 2008, crises, there were a
number of cases where minorities agreed on much higher interest rates than the one set at the 'par
rate' by the mortgage originator (Miller v Countrywide Bank, Martinez v Freedom Mortgage Tearn)
The argument behind this was that discriminatory pricing occurred as a result of the díscretion given
to the mortgage brokers that were involved in the decision making process in setting the final terms.
In other words the mortgage originators determined the 'markup' added to the 'par rate'. In none of
these cases though were the mortgage brokers themselves scrutinized or personally blamed. They
were treated more as a 'black box'. The courts did not directly examine the process where the
discriminatory decisions acfually occurred but rather focused on the mortgage originator's discretion
policy. It is unknown if pricing disparities occurred as a result of the mortgage brokers decision to
charge higher interest rates to minorities, specifically because they physically observed their race, or
whether it was the result of disproportionate weight being placed in variables correlated to race, such
as the neighborhood of the borrower. In either case it is impossible to understand the nature of these
discriminatory decisionq since it is diffrcult to revisit exact decision 
-making processes and
parameters that occurred in the past (Gillis, Spiess 20Ig).To overcome this obvious limitation, and
the inherent difficulty in recovering the 'whys and wherefores' of the particular decision that may
have been discriminatory, courts focus on means to facilitate discriminatory decisions, rather than
scrutinizing the decision-makers themselves. This limitation often forces the courts to generally
condemn the discretion given to the brokers as causing price disparities (Gillis, Spiess 20lg).
Unlike in the human decision making process though, algorithmic based procedures
theoretically be deconstructed. There is almost complete transparency on what specific decision
caused the disparity, since theoretically the decision making process can be recovered. One possible
way would be to examine the specific variables used by the algorithm similar to examining
coefficients in regressions. To be more specific, the decision rule of the algorithm can be inspected in
order for the most important va¡iables to be identified. Furthermore, the construction of the decision
rule itsell can also be inspected in order 'to measure which variables were instrumental in forming
the final rule.' One other possible measure to monitor the presence of discriminatory incentives in
the algorithmic procedure would be to report and compare the mortgage Specific details that are
produced by the 'Black Box' to what is actually later underwritten and assigned by the mortgage
broker as a result of his discretion. In cases where there is a clear difference between these two sets
of mortgage specific characteristics, one could assume' that the differences are products of
discriminatory incentives on the part of the mortgage broker.
Measurements to counter Predatory Lending
Fxisting Federal legislation that counters predatory lending has been proved to be too
inflexible, and as a.result unable to keep up with the lender innovations in predatory practices.
Existing anti-predatory laws have been unable to eliminate predatory lending, a fact which is
attributed to two factors. Firstþ, existing definitions of predatory-lending practices are not broad
enough to allow for a case-by.-case assessment of the suitability of the mortgages for borrowers,
which leaves room for predatory lenders to innovate the means of conducting predatory practices.
Secondly, existing, antiquated legislation such as the 'holder in due course' doctrine and the 'do
equity' requirement prevent borrowers from being justified in the court of law (Lehe, 2010). All of
the afore-mentionêd factors are going to be fully analyzed further below.
Major X'ederal Anti-Predatory Lending Loans: RESPA. TILA. HOEPA
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) was firstly enacted in 1968, to require 'meaningful
disclosure of credit terms.' It protects customers against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and
requires lenders to provide loan cost information so that the bonowers can 'comparison shop' for
specifïc types of loans. Under TILA, home mortgage borrowers have a right of rescission, a three-
day period where they can reconsider their decision, overview the loan specific terms and back out of
lending deal without losing any money. The three-day period is given to counter 'high-pressure sales
tactics used by unscrupulous lenders' (Lehe,2010). If the borrower does in fact decide to rescind,
then the originating lender or the current assignee must 'void' the mortgage, meaning that they need
to refund any amount paid by the borrower within twenty days of receiving the rescission notice.
Furthermore, under TILA, lenders can be found guilty of predatory practices.
There are however, several loopholes that limit TILA's ability to protect consumer interests.
Firstly, the Act does not require lenders to reveal costs that are related to 'credit reports, appraisals,
document preparation, title searches and insurance, notary and recording fees and even taxes (Lehe,
2010). In other words lenders can disguise the real cost of consumer loans. Secondly, the one-year
statute of limitations does not allow borrowers to be remedied for undisclosed loan terms that go into
effect after one year. For example, borrowers would not be able to be remedied against lenders who
did not disclose properþ the terms of adjustable rate mortgages, a mortgage loan with an interest that
adjusts based on 'an index which reflects the cost to the lender of borrowing on the credit
markets'(Lehe, 2010) mortgages that frequently produce higher interest rates after one year.
Borrowers that manage to overcome the statute of limitations nevertheless have to prove that they
detrimentally relied on the lenders disclosure. Borrowers that do not read the entire disclosure
statements will be unable to 'establish the required causal link between effoneous disclosure and
their actual damages' (Lehe, 2010).
The Real Estate Settlements Procedure Act (RESPA) was passed in 1974, and its purpose
was to ' aid the borrower or lessee in understanding the transaction by utilizing readily
understandable language to simplifu the technical nature of the disclosures.'aunder RESPA, any
mortgage loan transactions must conspicuously and clearly include all the costs that are faced by the
borrower and all the charges faced by the lender in connection to the transaction. Specifically, 'such
forms... shall indicate whether any title insurance premium included in such charges covers or
insures the lender's interest in the property, the borrower's interest, or both.'s Furthermore, RESPA
requires lenders and mortgage brokers to provide a 'good faith' estimation report of loan costs during
the three days of the application and a detailed report of the actual costs at closing. RESPA
a l2 u.s.c 2603-04
s tz u.s.c 2603-04
measurements such as the afore-mentioned however; are essentially ineffective since the lenders or
brokers are not actually held accountable in cabe of failing to provide 'good faith' estimations.
Finally, RESPA does not require lenders to infurm borrowers of their right to proofread the final
reports of costs at closing.
The most important federal regulation that directly addresses predatory lending is the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). It was enacted in 1994, as an amendment to TILA
to address.reverse redlining predatory practices. For loans that fall under HOEPA, certain lending
practices and loan terms are prohibited. Examples include but are not limited to 'higher interest rates
after borrower default, certain balloon type payments, negative amortization, making more than two
advance payments to borrowers from proceeds of the loan, and extending credit without regard to the
payment ability of the consumer'. HOEPA also addresses the issue of asset-based lending, where the
lender approves the loan based on the asset value of the home rather than the borrower's actual
ability to repay it, by requiring the lerider to include ocurrent and expected income, current obligation
and employment.'6 Most significantly, under HOEPA the 'holder due course' doctrine is abrogated,
for loans that fall under the I{OEPA umbrella, a significance which is going to be analyzed fully
below. Any abrogation under HOEPA is notewort'hy since the Act preserves the borrower's claims
against mortgage originators or current assignees unless the afore-mentioned parties can prove that a
'reasonable person' would not have realized that the loan falls under HOEPA requirements.
Unfortunately, the afore-mentioned HOEPA protections are limited since the Act only covers
a narrow scope of loans. The Act applies only to 'high-cost' home equity loans and does apply to
the most eommon types of mortgages such as 'reverse mortgagesT, purchase money mortgages8, or
u rs u.s.c ro¡g
7 
'With a reverse mortgage, a lender makes payments to the borrower from its home equity and subsequently recovers the
loan principal plus interest upon the borrower's sale of the home. About Reverse Mortgages for Seniors, U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., http.://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfhhecm/hecmabou.cfm (last updated Jan.5,200'
B 
'A purchase money mortgage is "[a] mortgage executed to secure the purchase money or a part thereof by a purchaser
of properfy, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the title thereto, or afterward, but as a part of the same
transaction." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1027 (3ded. 1969)'
open lines of credite. Specifically in order for the HOEPA restrictions to be enabled, the interest rate
points or fees of the loans must surpass the existing HOEPA threshold. I0 Engel and McCoy make it
clear that this threshold is exceedingly high,and does not cover the majority of predatory loans, since
HOEPA has 'has strong proscriptions but at best covers (only) the costliest five percent of subprime
home loan' (Engel, McCoy ,2007) Thus, lenders are able to exercise predatory lending practices in
loans that are not covered by HOEPA
External Barriers to Existing Legislation: The I'Do Equitvil Requirement and the rrHolder in
Due Courseft Doctrine
Victims of predatory lending who try to defend their case of foreclosure under existing anti-
predatory lending laws are usually met with external barriers, not including statutory requirements.
Borrowers who try to redeem themselves financially in the court of law during foreclosures are
usually met with the antiquated 'do equity' requirement, which obliges them to provide the full
amount of their debt to their debtor, before the court hears their 'equitable challenge.' Furthermore
existing law governing financial instruments such as mortgages limits the borrower's claims of
predatory lending. Specifically, borrowers who claim to be victims of predatory loans are limited by
the 'holders in due course' doctrine, which protects the assignee that currently holds the mortgage.
Furthermore, the 'assignment' of the mortgage also protects the originator from any possible suit
against him. (Lehe, 201,0)
The fundamental rationale behind the 'do equity' requirement is that "one \¡/ho seeks to avoid
the provisions of the written instrument must stand ready to discharge the implied obligation of
repayment of the sum borrowed, plus the lawful rate of interest."rr In other words, 'one who seeks
e 
'Open lines of credit, or a home equity line of credit, is "a form of revolving credit in which [a] home serves as
collateral." What You Should Know About Home Equity Lines of Credit, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.'
1o'IIOEPA requirements are triggered if the APR on the loan exceeds the yield on
comparable Treasury securities by more than ten percentage points, or if total points and fees paid at or before closing
exceed the greater of 8 percent of the total loan amount or $400. l5 U.S.C. 1602(aa)(l) Q006).'
tt Mi"h. Mobile Homeowners Ass'n v. Bank of the Commonwealth,223 N.W.2d 725,729 (Mich. Ct. App.1974)
equity must do equity'r2 as well. This requirement applies to foreclosure cases since they are
naturally equitable.t3 Courts thus will not respond to a foreclosure claim, even if the borrower claims
that the foreclosure is a result of predatory practices unless the borrower pays the full amount of the
debt to the current owner of the mortgage. Thus, practically any borrowers who face foreclosure as a
result of predatory loans are prevented from bringing their challenges into the court of law. The
requirement essentially obliges them to pay the full outstanding debt (principal + interest) something
that is almost always impossible. If the borrowers.were able to pay the full outstanding debt they
would have not defaulted on their loans in the first place. Some borrowers manage to 'do equity' by
refinancing on their mortgage with a new loan, a practice which is logically very risþ. Borrowers
who face foreclosure are not very likely to find another lender willing to finance their loan with
favorable terms, and even if they do, they run the risks on coming up against another 'predatory'
lender. Finally, another major limitation that borrowers meet in foreclosure is the difficulty to
identiff the exact liable agent that initiated the predatory lending practice. The securit izationof home
mortgages creates a ohorizontally segmented lending process in which the tasks of funding,
originating, serving, and holding mortgage loans are performed by legally unrelated business
entities' (Hauser, 200S). Securitization thus requires the assignment of the mortgage to another entity
after the process of the origination and mortgage loans are universally assigned (Hauser, 2008).
The assignment of the mortgage to another entity strips the assignee from any real liability
since the mortgage note is considered to fall under the 'holder in due course' dochine. This
antiquated piece of legislation applies to negotiable financial instruments such as mortgages and
protects the current holder of the mortgage from any liabilþ associated with the origination process
of the mortgage and the predatory practices that might have occurred during that. Any existing state
anti-predatory and federal regulations do not apply to assignees since they are shielded by this
t' Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole, 99 CaL Rph. 2d 678,685 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting 2 John Norton Pomeroy, A
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence As Administered in the United States of America
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doctrine. Specifically, the 'holder in due course precludes' the borrower from any relief by
'shielding the assigneé of a negotiable instrument from most claims and defenses to payment that a
borrower could assert against the fassignor]'(Hauser, 2008). In most cases where the borrower tries
to seek justice under existing anti-predatory legislation, the originator of the loan has already
vanished or is insolvent, and the 'holder in due course 'doctrine protects the current holder of the
nlortgage from being criminally prosecuted. In such cases borro\ilers are left without a legal recourse.
Essentially, borrowers trying to assert their claims under existing anti-predatory laws are unable to
seek justice, since the interaction of these laws with'holders in due course' doctrine produces a legal
framework under which any current holder of the mortgage note is heavily protected. As discussed
above, the only mortgages that do not fall under the 'holder in due course' doctrine are the ones that
fall under HOEPA. Unfortunately though, HOEPA only covers 5% of the most costly mortgages and
its abrogation of such doctrines is too limited to ensure that all victims of predatory lending practices
will be able to seek justice in the court of law.
Existing anti-predatory laws have been unable to eliminate predatory lending, largely because
they are too inflexible and under-inclusive or too specific; current definitions of predatory lending
practices are not broad enough to allow for a'case by case evaluation of the mortgage's suitability
for individual borrowers,' which leaves room for predatory lenders to create the means of conducting
predatory practices. In other words anti-predatory laws have developed in ways that are too
inflexible to adapt to the ever-evolving mortgage market (Lehe, 201,0). Existing definitions of
predatory-lending practices allow for lenders to create mortgage products that are excluded from the
scope of federal legislation. Furthermore, existing antiquated legislation such as the 'holder in due
course' doctrine and the 'do equity' requirement prevent borrowers from being justified in the court
of law since thèy are either unable to pay the full amount of debt or because their mortgage
originator is insolvent and the current holder of the mortgage is protected from any potential liability.
In order for the afore-mentioned shortcomings to be addressed, several measurements should
be taken. Firstly, a more flexible standard describin$ lender misconduct in the mortgage lending
market should be provided. Specifically, Congress should establish a'lender suitability duty of care',
a doctrine that is already established in several other financial markets. Applying this doctrine to the
mortgage market would place a 'fiduciary duty' upon mortgage brokers and lenders to potential
borrowers, similar to the fiduciary duty that is owed to investors by broker-dealers. In the context of
the securities market, 'broker-dealers have a duty to deal fairþ with their customers and to provide
investment advice that is suitable to the needs of the investor' (Ehrenberg, 2001). This doctrine
requires brokers 
- 
dealers to make sure that their customers can cover their trade, and has "evolved
into a doctrine to protect investors from having broker-dealers either make or persuade investors to
make inappropriate investnents' (Ehrenberg, 2001). If applied to the mortgage lending market this
dochine would function as a federal anti-predatory measurement, flexible enough to counter any
potential innovations of the predatory practices.
To battle the limitation that is faced by borrowers because of the 'do equity' requirements,
Congress should pass legislation that limits the application of the 'do equity' requirement in cases of
judiciary foreclosures where the borrowers claim to be victims of predatory loans. This can be a
difficult to establish, since the claims by the borrowers of being victims of predatory loans cannot be
proved until the matter is heard in a court of law. Nevertheless, a type of threshold on mortgage
parameters can be established which, if compared to the financial situation of the victimized
borrower, can produce an almost transparent image of whether the borrower is acfually a victim of
predatory loans, before an offîcial court hearing. Thus, in such cases the 'do equity' requirements
should be abolished.
Finally, Congress and the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) needs to pass legislation that
completely abrogates the 'holder of due course' requirement from all mortgage assignments. This
measurement will increase the 'assignee's liability' of any predatory practices that occirred during
origination, even if the originator has vanished or is insolvent. An abrogation as such, would force
assignees tb actually cut off flrnancing to loan originators or intermediaries that commit unlawful
practices during the origination process since their liability is no longer protected by the 'holder of
due course' doctrine.
The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Act of 2009
In the wake of the 2008, financial crises, Congress has applied a certain type of duty to
mortgage lenders. The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Act of 2009, which was passed as
amendment to TILA in May 2009, est¿blished a 'federal duty of care'r4 for mortgage brokers and
originators. This Act required mortgage originators to be, 1) licensed, registered and qualified as
mortgage originator, 2) 'diligently work to present the consumer with a range of residential mortgage
loan products for which the consumer likely qualifies and which are appropriate to the consumer's
existing circumstances, based on information known by, or obtained in good faith by, the
originator"r5 and 3) veri$ to creditors that the originator has fulfilled all mortgage origination
requirements. A mortgage loan is assumed to be appropriate if, ' the mortgage originator determines
in good faith, based on then existing information and without undergoing a full underwriting process,
that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay' and if 'the loan does not have predatory
characteristics.' 16 Even though the Act explicitly states that it is not going to establish a fiduciary
duty between mortgage originators and borrowersr?, it also states that any compensation received by
the originator when steering applicants to higher-cost mortgages will be eliminated.
It seems however, that the 'predatory characteristics' regulation under which a loan is considered
predatory adheres to the existing approach of previous anti-discriminatory lending regulations. A
tn H.R. ti28,tn rh cong. Qoog)
Is Id.Paragraphlo2
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more suitable measure would be to adopt a suitability duty that allows case-by-case evaluation of
mortgage specific characteristics to the borrower's needs and abilities (Lehe 2010).
Conclusion
contributes to the existing literature regarding the current nature of the mortgageMy paper 
market and how it introduced new types of discriminatory practices. The evolution of this market and
its changing structure has given rise to two fundamental discriminatory practices. These were
facilitated by the rapid technological advancements causing wider accessibility to financial products
and mortgages and increased the number of new potential customers. As certain banks reached a
national scale and were competing in a market of multiple financial products for millions of
customers, centralized databases and data-processing facilities were hugely invested in. Algorithms
were then introduced in the decision-making process regarding mortgage specific decisions, such as
calculating credit risk, to efficiently estimate such specifics for the large number of these potential
customers. The creation of the fwo government-sponsored enterprises (GSE)-Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp) established the secondary mortgage market and
the process of mortgage securitization, a process that inherently increased the financial complexity of
mortgage products. Furthermore, the process of securitization created a segmented lending process
where the responsibilities of funding, originating, serving, and holding mortgage loans were shared
by a number of financial agents: mortgage originators, underwriters, mortgage brokers, assignees and
arïangers. All these agents possess the means and incentives to discriminate at any point along the
decision-making process; mortgage originators and underwriters can use illegitimate proxy variables
in calculating the credit risk of customers that disproportionally harm minorities in order to avoid a
costly examination of the applicants actual mortgage-related characteristics and credit-history;
¿urangers can enable these originators by 'funding them through loan purchases'. All the afore-
mentioned factors conhibuted to the creation of two new discriminatory practices, predatory lending,
( sometimes referred to as 'reverse redlining') and algorithmic based discrimination.
Furthermore, even an existing discriminatory practice that was once alarmingly present in the
mortgage market, redlining, is not of the nature we once thought it was. The Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston provided evidence that shows that lenders do not discriminate on the basis of the racial
composition of the tract, in fact the rccíal composition of the tract is insignificant in the lending
process. Instead their results show that lenders discriminate based on the race of the applicant and
not of the tract, aresult of significance since existing bank regulation revolved around tract-specific
characteristics, like the racial composition of the community and not the race of the applicant himself
and how it might be related to the mortgage lending decision.
Existing legal doctrine has been unable to keep up with the changes within the mortgage
market and the inherent discriminatory practices of algorithmic discrimination and predatory lending.
For the former, the legal framework surrounding it has proved to be ineffective since it provides little
to no insight'on how to monitor the sophisticated statistical decision making process of today.
Variable exclusion, the most fundamental piece of legislation to counter algorithmic-based
discrimination has been proved to be ineffective. Theoretically an exclusion of a protected variable
(e.g. race) from the algorithmic process will decrease possible pricing disparities that were caused by
the inclusion of such variables. Evidence suggests though, that disparities can persist even if
protected variables are excluded from the algorithmic decision making process, since a number of
other variables correlating with the protected characteristic can pioduce this pricing difference. The
problem of the excluded variable being reconstructed from a combination of other variables is
particularly evident in the high-dimensional data sets of today where 'complex, highly non-linear
prediction functions are used' (Gillis, Spiess 2019). Such a problem might be difficult to counter
since the variables that reconstruct the protected characteristic can also be correlated with the credit-
risk of the borrower, meaning that they cannot be excluded from the statistical decision making
algorithm.
Furthermore, in cases that were brought to justice, where there was clear evidence of
discriminatory incentives being involved in the decision-making process, courts and legislative
bodies did not directly examine the process where the discriminatory decisions actually occurred but
rather focused on the mortgage originator's discretion policy. Such a course of action was chosen
since it is quite difficult, apparently, to fevisit the exact decision 
-making process and its parameters
that occurred in the past. My suggestion offers a potential solution to this issue. A measwe to
monitor the presence of discriminatory incentives in the algorithmic procedure would be to report
and compffe the underwriting details that are pioduced by the 'Black Box' to what is actually later
underwritten and assigned by the mortgage broker as a result of his discretion. In cases where there
is a clear difference between these two sets of mortgage specific characteristics, one could assume
that the differencås are products of discriminatory incentives on the part of the mortgage broker.
Thus, instead of scrutinizing the algorithmic-process itself, which is generally believed to be to
complicated, a comparison between the two sets of results can offer a sense of understanding in what
actually caused the pricing disparities.
In conclusion, existing Federal legislation that counters predatory lending has been proved to
be too inflexible, and as a result unable to keep up with the lender innovations in predatory practices
Anti-predatory laws have developed in ways that are too inflexible 'to adapt to the evolution of the
mortgage market'(Lehe, 2010). Existing definitions.of predatory-lending practices allow for lenders
to craft,mortgage products that fall outside the scope of federal legislation. Furthermore, current
antiquated legislation such as the 'holder in due course' doctrine and the 'do equity' requirement
prevent borrowers from being justified in the court of law since they are either unable to tender the
full amount of debt or because their mortgage originator is insolvent and the current holder of the
mortgage is protected from any potential liabitity. Congress should pass legislation that limits the
application of the 'do equity' requirement in cases of judiciary foreclosures where the borrowers
claim to be victims of predatory loans. Finally, Congress and the FTC (Federal Trade Commission)
need to pass legislation that completely abrogates the 'holder of due course' requirement from all
mortgage assignments.
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